


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psychology the catholic intellectual

N VAN KAAM

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**split between secular and reli-
gious learning rooted in psycho-
logical history must be healed to
prevent historical disaster.**

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY


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ADRIAN VAN KAAM

A psychology of the catholic intellectual



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EDITORIAL PREFACE

THE AIM OF SYNTHESIS SERIES

As the growing edge of knowledge increases its pace and widens the domain of man, new vistas strike us which are both exciting and frightening. Although the spreading light reveals more and more the marvels of our universe, still the bordering darkness of the unknown expands along with it.

Nowhere is the uncharted field of the universe of being more deeply felt today than in the area which concerns man himself. Here especially our growing knowledge deepens awareness of the vast unknown beyond our present range of vision.

We have begun to realize that the project of comprehending man is indeed gigantic. It is the conviction of all who seriously contemplate the problem that only a multi-disciplinary approach and synthesis will produce a true picture. We find emerging a cooperative effort by those engaged in any discipline which bears upon understanding man and promoting his well-being. The human sciences, the arts, philosophy, religion and all the helping arts reveal him in the several dimensions of his complex pattern of life.

SYNTHESIS SERIES is intended to introduce the reader to the experience of using the multi-disciplinary approach when attempting to understand himself and others. We believe this will lead to his perceiving and relating to the entire human family more effectively—that is, more in accord with rich depth and breadth of all those realities it contains. We hope this will help reduce the confusion caused by the over-simplified “answers” to problems of living which used to be offered by specialists in various fields.

Instead of the easy or quick answers we propose that each individual make steady serious effort to achieve a rich syntheses of concepts developed by many disciplines. This appears to be the only method that holds the promise of yielding the fundamental answer—the meaning his own existence is supposed to have—a meaning so often fretfully and falteringly sought by everyone whether he admits it or not. The promise and its realization in personal experience provide sufficient motive to undertake and sustain the search. But beyond this, one can foresee benefits which transcend individual well-being. For personal growth of many individuals brings about a *social atmosphere* which stimulates still further development toward a more meaningful life on the part of each member of the group.

This interaction between an individual and

others is apparent when we observe the opposite process of deterioration. Just as the most disruptive factor in society is the unrest caused by failure of its members to find the meaning of life, so the reverse holds true, that society will benefit at all levels in proportion to the success people have in their quest for the meaning they believe their existence is supposed to have.

SYNTHESIS SERIES, we repeat, is intended to introduce the reader to the new multi-disciplinary method in carrying out the search for the meaning his life is to have when viewed in reference to the destiny of mankind.

Other works by same author

A Light to the Gentiles, Bruce Publishing Company

Religion and Personality, Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Personality Fulfillment in the Spiritual Life,

Dimension Books, Inc.

Existential Foundations of Psychology,

Duquesne University Press

The Art of Existential Counseling, Dimension Books, Inc.

The Demon and the Dove — Personality growth through
literature, Duquesne University Press

A Psychology of the Catholic Intellectual

We may consider the Catholic intellectual from various viewpoints. As theologians, we may ask ourselves what he should believe as a member of the Church. The question for psychology, however, is not *what* but *how* the intellectual believes. As philosophers, we may investigate the metaphysical relationship between faith and life. As theoretical scientists, we may explore the interaction between the religion and one or the other science. But psychology is concerned with the interaction between the religious and the intellectual attitudes. Such comparisons may give us a feeling for the task of the psychologist in considering the Catholic intellectual. To make this task more clear, we shall first clarify the terms of our topic and outline the plan we shall follow.

The term "Catholic intellectual" has many meanings, from merely the Catholic with a college education to the person who participates creatively in the growth of contemporary thought within his area of competence. The college graduate is sometimes called an intellectual even if his reading is restricted

to *Time*, *The Post* and best sellers. Obviously, we shall not use the term "intellectual" in this euphemistic sense. Another loose use of the term applies to those persons who function as professional "repeaters" in colleges and secondary schools. They repeat well what has already been better said by others, especially by their own former professors in graduate school. A psychological study of this type of "intellectual" would be perhaps even less relevant for our purpose. The Catholic intellectual in whom we are interested is the creative one. He is a man who not only has achieved competence in his field but thinks about it. Moreover, he thinks about it not only as a specialist but also as a Catholic. In other words, he is a specialist who at times meditates on the relationship between his specialized knowledge and Revelation. In addition, this Catholic intellectual is creative. He contributes in some way to the growth of his field of knowledge and to that of Catholic thought in the light of his specialty.

We shall study this creative Catholic intellectual from the viewpoint of psychology. How can his psychology be described? What are his attitudes as a Catholic intellectual? What should they be ideally? These questions divide our topic into a psychology of the actual and one of the ideal consciousness of the Catholic intellectual. First, an analysis of

the consciousness of the Catholic intellectual may give us the main constituents of its structure. As a Catholic, he believes in the Revelation; as an intellectual, he possesses a special knowledge in some field of learning; as a man, he relates these two forms of knowledge to each other in his life. In this aspect, the fundamental psychology of all Catholic intellectuals of all times is the same. There are differences, however, in the way in which they relate the two types of knowledge to each other. They may keep them more or less separated, or they initiate interaction between them. In the first case we speak of a schizoid, in the latter of a dialectical Catholic intellectual consciousness. Because of historical reasons, we shall see that this division between the schizoid and the dialectical coincides with our division between the actual and the ideal. For we shall see that the actual consciousness of the Catholic intellectual is still somewhat schizoid, while its ideal dialectical quality has still to develop.

The actual consciousness of the Catholic intellectual cannot be compared to an island that suddenly emerges in the ocean after an earthquake. It is the gradual appearance in one area of life, the intellectual area, of a general Christian consciousness that is dominantly either schizoid or dialectical. Neither is the psychology of the Western Christian

today an abrupt phenomenon without a past. The structure of the schizoid Christian consciousness is an historical structure. Indeed, the actual structure of any cultural consciousness can only be understood by a psychological study of its development. Every significant change in man's historical situation, in fact, may lead to a change in his consciousness. Even in the early evolution of the animal species, each major alteration of environment was a challenge to the organism. The biological response to this challenge was fixation or adaptation. Fixation led to the extinction of the species; adaptation, however, means further development, while the mode of adaptation determined a new development of organic structure. Similarly, an alteration in the historical situation is a challenge to man's consciousness. His psychological response to this appeal of reality may be schizoid or dialectical. The schizoid position, when maintained for centuries, may lead to cultural neurosis or psychosis, and thereby to the destruction of consciousness. A dialectical response, however, leads to growth within the new situation, and the mode of dialogue determines the structure of consciousness. The predominant answer of a culture to a change in the historical situation determines the structural development of cultural consciousness. When such a response is

maintained by the influential members of a culture over a sufficient period of time, it will modify this consciousness. This phenomenon is sometimes called the modification of the structure of cultural intentionality. In this manner, a culture defines its project of existence by its response to the changing situation.

There is, however, a fundamental difference between animal evolution and human history. The biological response of the animal species cannot be freely changed as the conscious response of man can. No animal can change at will the development of its organic structure. But man can alter the structural development of his consciousness. The conscious mode of adaptation to environment is therefore called dialectical instead of adaptive. The organic reactions of an animal species to a change in environment are direct and immediate reactions to an outward stimulus. In the case of man, however, we deal with a response that may be delayed, interrupted, and retarded by a process of reflection. Through this possibility of delay and reflection, man exceeds the boundaries of organic life. Man as consciousness lives in a symbolic universe, a world of meaning. His delay between stimulus and response allows possibility for freedom. Therefore, the psychological structure of consciousness is not determined in an absolute

sense, but can be changed by a free decision of man at any moment of his development. It is for this reason that we shall now consider the historical structure of Catholic intellectual consciousness.

*The Psychology of the Structural
Development of the Actual Christian
Consciousness in the Catholic Intellectual*

The psychology of Christian awareness reveals a rift between profane and religious experience, between cultural and divine commitment. This fundamental disjunction of the Christian mind explains the ambiguous psychology of the Catholic intellectual today. This schizoid "split" may be more readily understood in the light of the history of Christian consciousness.

The psychologist who explores the experiential structure of Christianity around the seventh century is struck by an amazing unity of faith and human existence. A well-integrated consciousness was nurtured by a deeply religious perception of nature, life, labor, and society. Western Europe at that time was divided into small domains which were economically independent. Each one of them formed a self-sufficient agrarian community in which money had little value, for trade was virtually non-existent. The peasants cultivated what was necessary for the subsistence of the community; hence, the

source of wealth and power was not legal tender, cash, or currency but the possession of tillable lands. The vast majority of the faithful were peasant serfs who were attached by birth to the land which they tended. They did so for an absolute master who administered their affairs and defended them. This knight received his domain from a count or duke in exchange for his service in time of war. The count or duke stood in the same "feudal" relationship to his king or emperor.

The agrarian world, its administration, labor, and recreation were not perceived as outside the religious realm, as a necessary evil or a moral contagion easily leading to sin and loss of salvation. On the contrary, this world was lived as a divine appeal, a holy service of the most High. Dedication to ploughing, seeding, and harvesting was not experienced as leaving God for something else, but as a consecrated endeavor that would secure nourishment for the people of the Lord. The spirited defense of hearth and home was not a worldly adventure split off from faith but was lived as a sacred obligation toward God's chosen people. Political and administrative functions alike were integrated within the religious consciousness. The Divine Majesty was the radiant center of the hierarchical structure which consisted of emperor and pope, bishop and count,

priest and knight. The will of God came down through this hierarchy to the Christian people who were peasant serfs. Within this consciousness, such activities as agrarian production, architecture, and fervent participation in community projects were not alien to the religious experience. They *were* religious experience. The cultivation, protection, and celebration of this world by all social groups were lived as a liturgy. Faith and life formed a perfect natural unity.

This cultural situation, however, was soon to change. The psychology of history teaches us that every new significant social situation evokes a new response in human consciousness. Hence, social change leads to change in the structure of awareness. This psychology is also true of religious consciousness. Such a change does not necessarily entail an alteration in commitment to revealed truth, but it may imply a considerable difference in the way in which consciousness experiences the relation of this truth to the new situation. The Western consciousness in the early Middle Ages was faced with a decisive situation, the response to which would pattern the development of the psychological structure of Western man for centuries to come.

At the end of the tenth century, the economic development of the West took an unexpected turn. Western Europe, finally free

from plunderings, pillages, and massacres by Vikings, Saracens, and Huns, experienced a sharp increase in its population. The self-sufficient domains were no longer capable of caring for all of their people. Many peasant serfs were forced to send their sons into the world outside their domains so that their parents might fulfill their obligations to their lords by relinquishing a part of the harvest. For those sons who could not survive within the domain of their parents, three possibilities were open. One was to live on the charity of Church and society as vagrants, beggars, or travelling laborers. The second was to look for waste land outside the domain and to farm it as independent tenants for the owner. This occupation led to the emergence of a new type of community, the village, a society of poor peasants who were no longer serfs protected by a knight. The third possibility was to enter trade. Trade began very simply. In some areas there was an abundance of products which could not be consumed by the local population. Merchants simply sold them in regions where these products were scarce. The increasing population led to a rapid increase in this type of commerce. These merchants gradually settled down as free burghers in cities, finding favorable locations at roadways and harbors. Craftsmen and artisans were drawn to the cities to serve the

needs of the burghers, while the independent peasants of the villages took care of their nourishment. The new economic relations were incorporated in social organizations called guilds. Money became the most important medium of exchange.

To be sure, this new situation influenced deeply the functioning of the agrarian society. The economic self-sufficiency of the domains was soon broken up by the commerce of free farmers and merchants. In view of the fact that the stability of the whole society was based on economic relationships, conflicts were unavoidable. The phenomenological psychology of cultural consciousness is deeply concerned with these very conflicts for, as we shall see, they foreshadowed the psychological ambiguity of the Catholic intellectual of today, whose situation is historically rooted in these conflicts of the end of the tenth century. Up to this time, trade had been necessary only when the population of a domain was threatened in its subsistence as a result of a bad harvest, failure of crops, or natural disaster. Trade was then utilized as a kind of primitive Red Cross operation, a social emergency service in which representatives of other domains traded what crops they could spare with the stricken population, asking in return only what the latter could reasonably give or promise so that the safety resources

of the benefacting domains might be replenished. One can understand what feelings of repulsion flooded the community when it was discovered at times that selfish individuals abused suffering people in need of food for survival in order to stuff their own pockets. Such selfishness was experienced as asocial and immoral, for it endangered the very existence of the only social institution which guaranteed survival in emergency. One might compare this reaction with the indignation one would experience today if Red Cross workers would dishonestly deflect to their own material advantage the reimbursements intended for people stricken by floods or earthquakes.

Money at the end of the tenth century was not productive; it was kept for use only in time of disaster. Thus money too was part and parcel of the only social emergency institution which could protect this primitive society still so vulnerable because of the absence of industry, engineering, science and medicine. Money was the emergency treasury to be lent to those who needed it to survive. One can understand then how the social consciousness revolted against any man who dared to ask rent for this social aid, who fed himself on the hungry and poverty stricken. In such a situation it was clearly against the Christian conscience to enrich oneself by means of trade or lending

of money; it was in direct opposition to the central tenet of love for the neighbor to which Christianity had committed itself so deeply.

However, while the economic structure of this society was changing, the structure of the consciousness of the people did not change so easily, for it was pre-reflective, permeated with deep-seated emotions, passions, and imaginations; so deeply permeated indeed that these reactions were no longer available to reflective consciousness.

The burgher who made trade his means of livelihood and of personal enrichment could deny but not destroy his conscience which was still structured in response to the demands of the former social situation. He somehow kept feeling vaguely and darkly, no matter how he reasoned about it, that trade was irreligious, sinful, a necessary evil in which he unfortunately had to indulge in order to survive within the new structure of society. He could not understand, of course, that logical reasoning cannot change structures of consciousness which are deeply rooted in one's existence, and that a radical transformation of pre-reflective cultural consciousness would have required an agonizing reappraisal in depth by the population as a whole illuminated by cultural psychologists. What was actually happening was a serious conflict of con-

science and a first split in the consciousness of the European burgher between his religious and his practical-cultural intentionality.

In the former society not only economy but also science, justice, and the study of law were permeated by the contemporary psychological structure of experience. They reflected the intellectual-emotional aversion from trade when it was used as a means of self-enrichment instead of socio-economic support of emergency needs. Therefore, the traditional norms of law and science opposed trade as a means of self-enrichment. Hence, new forms of law and science, which aimed at the promotion and protection of commerce, emerged among the burghers. But the new laws, established in the service of trade were experienced secretly and deep down as irreligious or even anti-religious by the burghers who needed them for the efficient organization of their world. Thus the disjunction between the religious experience and that of daily life were gradually deepened. The new law and science were experienced as purely mundane, as out of tune with religious existence.

The development of the life of the tradesman also led to a direct collision with the interests of clergy and nobility who were the leaders of the existing society. The burgher in his new situation needed freedom

of movement, of contract, and of property, prerogatives which were unknown among the serfs on the domain. He also needed an administration of justice which was more efficient than the traditional and more adapted to his new situation. Finally, he needed security for his trade.

The conflicts of the burghers with nobility, bishops, and monasteries brought them into contact with kings and powerful vassals who were willing to grant them exemptions from certain laws in exchange for money. In this way the burghers maintained the support of the king, who in turn used their financial contributions to hire mercenaries and civil servants to keep him independent of the knights. This increasing power of the kings enabled them to protect the trade of the burghers over large regions. Precisely here were the roots of the later absolute royal power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was unfortunate that the burgher was forced in such a manner to gain his economic freedom against the political and monetary interests of the higher clergy. His feeling that his actions were at odds with his religious conscience were reinforced. In the heat of his pursuit of commercial interests, he was able to repress the awareness of his guilt feelings. This repression, however, necessarily led to a proliferation of neurotic guilt and prepared

for the explosions of guilt and anxiety which would culminate centuries later in the ghastly waves of paranoid behavior, such as the horror of the Inquisition, the burning of witches, and the mutual massacre of Christian denominations.

Thus the agrarian society was broken up in most respects. The burgher was forced to withdraw from this society in spite of his conflicts of conscience and frequently against the authority of clergy and nobility. About the year 1200, however, the cities had grown to such strength that everyone had to accept the burghers, at least economically. They were a force to be reckoned with. Even the nobility and the clergy began to profit from the advantages of the new economy.

However, the disjunction of consciousness into a religious and a "wordly" one was not as easily solved as the problem of economic disparity. Perhaps it could not be healed at that time, for it was rooted in the depths of lived existence which is not immediately open to logical discussion. It was not a speculative but a "lived" conflict, not primarily a collision of syllogisms but of commitments which were psychologically experienced as incompatible in the consciousness of the European man. Mere logic cannot solve psychological conflicts; a psycho-logic is necessary. But an existential depth psychology

was not yet developed and could not illuminate the thinking minds of the thirteenth century. As a result, the psychological disturbance became a *hidden* sickness never diagnosed as such, a treacherous malady which slowly poisoned and perverted the European mind. It would lead to centuries of pain and suffering among well-meaning people who could not be aware of the demons of neurotic guilt and anxiety which were urging them on relentlessly.

The European burgher experienced a crisis of Faith as a result of this fundamental distinction of the structure of his consciousness. Moreover, the technical and scientific knowledge of the burgher increased daily, while his knowledge of the Faith was no deeper or more extensive than that of the serfs under the old system. He knew the Our Father, the Hail Mary, and the Apostle's Creed; he was almost never exposed to sermons. The new scientific sophistication of the burgher was nurtured, moreover, by a wave of conflicting notions from Greek and Arabian philosophies which spread over Europe. A genial Dominican thinker, Thomas Aquinas, became aware of the symptoms of the emotional disturbance in Western man in one small area of human life, the area of conceptuallogical knowledge which reflected a split personality. As a response to the symptoms in this one domain of human exist-

ence, Aquinas devised an intellectual, logically coherent system in which the profane thoughts of contemporary thinkers and past pagan philosophers were related to the Revelation as known in the thirteenth century. However, the demonstration of an intellectual system was not able to cure the "lived" disease which was deeply hidden in the depths of the human consciousness.

Aquinas' intellectual synthesis of Faith and life was sound in principle and covered amazingly well the limited sacred and profane knowledge of his century, but it was not translated by clergy and laymen into lived experience and into the practice of everyday existence. As a result, it did not stem the rapid growth of the sickness of the European consciousness into a neurosis and psychosis of massive proportions. The splendid synthesis of Aquinas remained an impressive castle in the air that did not affect deeply the psychology of the Western man. In the hands of later pedantic theologians, it deteriorated into an empty skeleton unrelated to the real life situation. However, we should not be harsh in our judgment, for it was almost impossible for Medieval man, lacking psychological knowledge, to diagnose adequately the depths of the emotional sickness which pervaded society like a malicious epidemic. The cleavage between Faith and life was almost bound to lead to

a rupture between Church and society, between clergy and laity.

The disastrous condition of the Medieval clergy precipitated the crisis. Their religious integrity had been undermined by an invasion of members of the nobility who competed for positions of wealth and honor. The new monarchies had substituted mercenaries for knights, a change which lessened the importance and thereby the political power of these noblemen. The increase in births among their families was no longer absorbed by crusades and military adventures. An increasing number of families of the nobility was faced with the problem of finding positions of dignity for their offspring which would permit them to live comfortably without disgrace. Trade and agriculture were considered shameful occupations for a man of noble descent. The only respectable positions available to them were offices in convents, monasteries, and dioceses which had become rich through donations bestowed by faithful people over the centuries. The weaker the condition of the nobility, the stronger their fascination with the administration of the Church. Many of these noblemen, once they were bishops, showed little concern for the religious needs of the people. They resided on rich estates, enjoying hunting and other diversions, while they del-

egated their religious duties to poorly paid priests.

The hierarchical organization of the earlier society was thus broken up by the new social situation. The old nobility had lost its force and meaning, and a new type of nobleman emerged who dedicated his life to the service of the absolute monarchies. The serfs of the past had drastically dwindled in number; they were now a small insignificant minority of the followers of Christianity. They lived their Faith in the old way which integrated them in the Church structures of the past. But the new mass of Christians formed by the burghers found no place of its own in the life of the Church. They experienced themselves as citizens of an alien world which somehow by its very nature was at odds with the Christian vision. All groups of the former hierarchy of society were thus changed, except for the clergy, who had been able to maintain their position because of traditional respect, substantial land holdings, and the need of the guilty and anxious burgher for the sacraments which would relieve his anxiety and save his soul. The split between Church and world led many burghers to the mistaken notion that the clergy should be identified with the Church itself, while they—the burghers—should be identified with the “bad” new world. There was a kind of unwritten pact between the two worlds, ac-

according to which the burgher would assist economically the Church world of bishops and numerous clergy. This religious society, in turn, would help the society of the burghers by relieving their guilt feelings and guaranteeing their salvation.

On many other points, dissension between the two worlds seemed unavoidable, for both engaged in politics and competition for power. The intellectuals among the burghers would suggest political and juridical moves which would curb the influence of episcopal noblemen and knightly abbots. They would enhance in this way the domains of the religious in the state. As Christian intellectuals, however, they felt disturbed about their maneuvers, a guilt which was deepened by the Church's free use of excommunication. In about 1300, for example, half of Christianity was in one way or another excommunicated. This was an effective weapon against the burgher and against the Christian intellectual because both — plagued by deep-seated guilt and anxiety — could not afford to be cut off from the sacraments in which they believed as their only means of salvation. In the eyes of burgher and intellectual laymen alike, it seemed as if the clergy "possessed" the Church exclusively as a means for opulent living, just as they themselves were possessors of the world of

trade, secular law, and primitive profane science.

The more deeply a burgher was involved as a secular intellectual in the formation of this new world, the more deeply he experienced the tragic split in his experiential life. For the prosperous burghers who constantly felt the pressures of buried guilt, dread, and need for expiation were prone to project these feelings on the intellectuals among them. Naturally these new intellectuals were involved more conspicuously than the others in the shaping of what everyone felt to be an unholy society. Therefore, when a Churchman turned against an intellectual burgher, he would usually find the non-intellectual burghers at his side, even when the quarrel concerned matters of secular jurisprudence, art, or learning. Any layman judge who would convict a clergyman would be excommunicated, but any layman could be convicted by theologians. This situation gave the Churchmen a powerful advantage, especially against the intellectuals of the competing society, who easily fell into ambiguous statements which could be used against them at the moment that a churchman found it advantageous to eliminate them from the scene. A denunciation by a high churchman would be followed by a search of the papers of the intellectual condemned. This investigation would readily reveal some theologically

unsound statement which could bring the author to the rack, to prison, or to the stake. The new Christian intellectuals, therefore, had to be careful not to disagree too openly with theologians who were the intellectuals of the other competing society.

The increasing urbanization of Europe during the thirteenth century changed the social constellation to such a degree that the burgher became the most prevalent type in man turned against an intellectual burgher, himself from the only other large and fast growing group in European society, the clergymen. The split in Christian consciousness had led thus to two types of Western man; two ways of making a living, the sacred and the profane; two kinds of study and of students, the theological and the intellectual. As a result of this rupture, a dialogue between profane and sacred learning was no longer feasible. Aquinas had delayed the cessation of dialogue, at least in the intellectual sector, but after him the dialogue died. Theologians in the late Middle Ages would at the utmost repeat the phraseology of that former dialogue that Thomas had once developed with the secular world of his time. The absence of actual dialogue between the two types of learning hindered the development of both. Secular learning was not enlightened by Revelation; religious learning was no longer stimulated by new perspec-

tives of truth uncovered by thinkers among the laity.

Theology without dialogue became a dilapidated structure, obsolete and pedantic. Deep unconscious feelings of inadequacy were unescapable in the representatives of a discipline which had temporarily lost not its truth but its momentum, not its logic but its dynamism, not its scholarly exposition but its relevance for the actual concrete life situation. This defensive attitude led to dark insinuations and ambiguous hints concerning intellectual innovators outside the realm of theology. The layman intellectual was soon tainted by the suspicion of heresy and seemed to carry the stench of damnation. He was the isolated outsider torn between his intellectual curiosity and repressed feelings of guilt. He was the unappreciated spokesman of a hesitant society whose insecure members disliked to be reminded of the split in consciousness which everyone tried to conceal.

Gradually this society was pervaded by the persuasion that living in sin was almost unavoidable in this world. Even being a part of this society was deemed to be against God's will. The prospect of damnation loomed heavily before the eyes of Medieval man. From the thirteenth century on, the dread of death hovered over Western humanity. Death was and is no longer anticipated in

experience as the transition to a new existence after a life spent in the cultivation of a world given by God as a holy project of earthly existence. Death is an ordeal, the advent of wrath.

The products of human behavior in a given cultural period embody for the psychologist the main orientations of the consciousness of that period. The books, plays, poems, sermons, sculpture, and painting of the period clearly reveal, for example, man's perception of death. The imagination of late Medieval man was sickeningly preoccupied with its gruesome aspects: putrefaction, decay, foul stench, the wriggling of hideous worms in rotting flesh, the ghastly deformation of once radiant women and handsome kings, death as a grimacing skeleton mowing down with his scythe sinners of all classes and ages. All of this is alive like a nightmare in sermon, print, and painting—the nightmare of the late Medieval man. Death was no longer experienced as a beginning of life, as a condition for the resurrection of a trans-terrestrial humanity which has fulfilled its historical mission. This morbid imagination was reinforced by the toll taken by old and new contagious diseases which depopulated the urbanized society. The black death of 1346 destroyed one third of the population of Europe.

The Christian intellectuals were now singled out in sermons and spiritual writings. They were reminded that death would end their proud musings and idle speculations, and that they dared not be hopeful about their salvation. The perception of secular learning as a threat to salvation and its identification with pride were partly due to defensive attitudes in both the higher and the lower clergy. Many members of the higher clergy had neither the taste nor the self-discipline necessary for concentrated study and creative thought. Moreover, many of them spent time and energy in creating a favorable public image and cultivating relationships which might be helpful in climbing the ladder of ecclesiastical eminence. The clever churchman had to be seen at the right time by the right people to whom he had to say the right thing. The time-consuming technique of being present for such meetings left little time for the silent presence to the world of ideas in the quiet of the churchman's study. The lower clergy, on the other hand, were badly educated. They nevertheless posed as the wise men who knew all the answers.

When such a clergy was faced with studious men of secular learning whose thought they could not comprehend, they necessarily developed feelings of irritation, guilt, and inferiority. The very existence of such men

suggested that the clergy might not have all the answers, that life could be dedicated to less profitable but more spiritual pursuits than ecclesiastical climbing, and that study might even be a duty for those churchmen whose decisions had such impact on large groups of the population. The fact that many men of learning came to heretical misconceptions and that some of them were proud and rebellious complicated the situation. This made it easier for some churchmen to project their wounded pride on the irritating lay intellectuals and finally on the zeal for profane learning itself. Well meaning spiritual writers in convents and monasteries sometimes took up this lead and celebrated depreciation of thought and study as a condition for holiness and a sound maxim of spirituality. All this led gradually to a special manifestation of the split of Christian consciousness, a veiled anti-intellectualism. Stupidity was sometimes identified with simplicity; literal repetition of memorized phraseology was called humility; lack of zeal for learning was confused with detachment. On the other hand, the search for truth was bewailed as pride; questioning as betrayal of faith; culture as a loss of the simplicity of the dove.

The conflict of conscience which had sharpened itself to a preoccupation with death and damnation soon became for many

their only tie with the Church. For only the Church offered means of grace which could liberate from sin and relieve the guilt and anxiety which kept boiling up from hidden sources. It was neither love nor spiritual life that bound many men to sacraments, devotions, pilgrimages, and indulgences; it was the conflict of conscience, the dread and the burden of guilt.

This mentality led to a commercial dimension of Christian consciousness. The men of the world desired to trade their possessions for the spiritual possessions of the world of religion. Grace was experienced as obtainable in quantities which were in proportion to the number of good works, sacraments, and donations. Also, the relation to God was no longer experienced as an encounter in love, but as a relationship which could be computed in terms of mortal and venial sins. The spiritual life of many was reduced to preoccupation with the lines of demarcation between types of sin. The Christian consciousness developed a marketing orientation which attempted to reduce the infinite to the finite. It obscured the mysteries of Faith by means of material imagination.

At one time, symbols had been the expression of higher reality. They were now replaced by plebeian depictions and personalizations. Take for example, the doctrine of the merits of the Saints. In the imagination

of many, they were a kind of capital, a bank of graces infinitely increasing; they could be distributed in small amounts by the Church and the pope. When people attempt to reduce the infinite to the finite, then this finite necessarily takes on enormous proportions. The counting consciousness exhausted itself in computations. Every Christian became a banker with shares in the stockmarket of salvation. Many people experienced the Church as a kind of insurance company. They counted and counted: so many Masses before and after death, so many pilgrimages and indulgences to pay off so many years of purgatory, so many donations to Church and clergy. The spiritual life became a mad race for spiritual security bonds. Worse, nearly everything involved in this frenzied rush was obtainable for money. In the consciousness of simple people, sacraments were a kind of magic wand which worked automatically. For so much money the clergyman would deliver so much grace. This deformation might be called the automation of the Christian psyche which dimmed the awareness of the importance of personal disposition in the reception of the sacraments.

One can understand how an intellectual in such a culture experienced conflict between his fascination with thinkers who had written about the mystery of existence and the childish representations of divine mystery

that flooded his society. He found depth in the writers of his world which he missed in the pictorial sermons on death and damnation. This experience made him more than ever the captive of secular learning and widened the rift between his intellectual and religious existence.

The repressed guilt and anxiety had now reached its boiling point. The sick imagination flooded by anxiety ran amuck. The demon of dread inside was projected outside. People began to see devils everywhere. The person who behaved in an unusual way was suspected of being possessed by the devil. The punishment of these scapegoats would relieve for a while the anxiety of the community. But soon new victims were needed, for anxiety and guilt were like a tide that could not be stemmed by the execution of the men and women on whom these feelings were projected.

With the beginning of the fourteenth century the number of witch trials increased at an alarming rate. Western humanity experienced itself as a battleground of demons who waged war for the possession of their souls. The projection of the demon of guilt and anxiety on people who were old and ugly or behaved strangely led to the burning of witches. Townspeople would gather and cheer the torturing of a woman believed to be possessed by the spirit of evil.

Witches were said to have made a pact with Satan in person which gave them the power to spread disease and pestilence, to inflict wounds, to destroy the harvest, and to change themselves into animals roaming the countryside. Two Dominican monks, Johan Sprengler and Heinrich Kramer, both appointed by the Pope as inquisitors in Germany, prepared a manual for witch hunting, the famous *Malleus Mallificorum*, or *Witch Hammer*. In accordance with the *Malleus*, thousands of people were indicted and tortured on the rack in order to obtain confession of witchcraft and the names of alleged accomplices who were then tortured in turn. Legs were crushed, bodies were torn to pieces, wedges were driven under fingernails until the victims cried out to the members of the Inquisition that they were indeed possessed. Those who were convicted were burned alive or burned after beheading, strangling, or mutilation. These practices lasted for centuries among both Catholic and Protestant populations.

As we have seen, the small number of intellectual laymen of such societies were already in a precarious position. Many of them now were suspect as heretics, followers of Satan, or men possessed by the devil. The judges who condemned them, albeit with the best intentions, were frequently advised by theologians of the Inquisition. The split of

Christian consciousness thus found a gruesome expression in the tense meeting between the grave theologian of the Inquisition and the suspect intellectual writhing on the rack. As a result, intellectuals became more cautious than ever, for any questioning of the paranoid outbursts in their society meant the risk of their own lives.

A certain part of the intellectual elite withdrew from the wild devotions of the people. If the world was really sinful in itself, the best thing to do seemed to be to leave this world and to find God in one's heart. This was the beginning of a movement called the "modern devotion." It was an attempt by Christian laymen to return to the life of the Church by leaving the world and so to transcend the split in their own existence. They sought for a sanctity out of this world and were soon known for their ignorance of worldly matters. The nickname of a prior of one of their monasteries in Windesheim, "Johnny I-don't-know," was considered an honor. The *Imitation of Christ* is a remarkable expression of this one-sided spiritual reaction. Grace is experienced deep in the soul; both theological and secular learning are considered a potential danger for spiritual life; contact with people in the wicked world tend to make man worse. This beautiful little book with gems of wisdom and religiosity was soon adopted as next in

importance to the Bible in many religious communities. It spread not only its spiritual message but also its slightly veiled atmosphere of anti-intellectualism; it thus tended to reinforce the split in Christian consciousness. The modern devotion led many souls to holiness, but this movement was too much out of this world to be fruitful in the long run for Christianity as a whole. It was an answer of genuine piety which could not reach the root of a psychological disturbance. It would not heal the breach between Faith and world.

Other groups of laymen, especially in cities and at the courts of the kings, tried to find a solution to the problem simply by living the split consciousness in a double life. They developed a double personality, a religious one while in Church, a sinful one when in their world. Unrestricted piety and unrestricted sinfulness could be found in one and the same person. For example, Louis XI of France (1462-1483) would steal, deceive, and murder without mercy in order to establish his position of power, but at the same time he would spend hours of piety in his private chapel. Certain groups of intellectuals manifested this double personality in the realm of thought. They would think and write like pagans and sensualists while praying like saints in church and chapel.

The separation of God and world finally

found its absolute expression in a scientific system that would dominate the fifteenth century. This system of thought was called nominalism and was developed by Ockham (1350). This philosophy formulated in concepts what was experienced by many laymen in daily life. A split in consciousness leads to a break-up of all things. When the world is experienced as separated from God, there is nothing left to bind this world together. This is especially true when the people who do the separating still believe in God as the Creator. In such a case they are unable to invent another principle of unity which would bind people and things together. If God is the only possible principle of unity and if this principle is absolutely separated from the world, then the world goes to pieces. Accordingly, nominalism teaches that everyone and everything is absolutely individualistic. Only what you can see, touch, measure exists. Universal concepts such as truth, goodness, unity, love, man are names without content. God, too, is totally separated from his creation. He is a first mover of the world, not its merciful Father. His omnipotence means that he can do what he likes. Therefore, He is whimsical and undependable. Even the creation of man was an arbitrary act. After fulfilling this whim, God cannot maintain interest in his creatures for this would mean weakness in Him. His

commandments too are capricious. For God is omnipotent and can thus determine in an arbitrary way what is good and bad. The distinction is only a question of a name; it could have been just the opposite. Man is, thus, totally independent from God and can keep the commandments by sheer effort of his own free will. Nominalism was the scientific expression of the split in Christian consciousness. It was not accepted everywhere in its totality. Neither was it usually thought through to its final consequences as we have done here in this simplified account. But it dominated, in one form or another, the thought of Western Christianity in the fifteenth century.

The Reformation was a form of reaction which attempted to remedy some of the symptoms of the psychological disease of Christianity. While it partly succeeded, partly failed in this attempt, it did not cure the psychological disturbance itself, the root of all symptoms. It reaffirmed the psychological split as the modern devotion did before. The Counter-Reformation would do the same.

The layman intellectual had indeed lost the dialogue with divine Revelation and theology. Hence, the thought of some had become bizarre and out of touch with the doctrine of the Church. As a consequence, the intellectual seemed to justify at times

the suspicion of him that had been built up since the year one thousand. After the reformation, the closed community of the clergy was more wary than ever of the intellectuals in the isolated community of the laity. Catholic theology, shocked by the Reformation, became anxious and defensive. It closed itself up in an ivory tower. Religious and secular education became increasingly separated. Secular learning also built its walls of defense. For it too tried desperately to avoid the tension engendered by the psychological split in the European mind. If education had faced the issue, it could have led to dialogue. And dialogue, no matter how painful and confusing, is the last and only hope for the West. Without this interaction, there is no means of healing the breach. One can help the victims of the sickness of the West by assisting them in gaining personal adjustment to the unconscious split in their own existence. To fulfill this need, counseling centers and guidance services are increasing in all school systems in the West. But they will fight a desperate battle as long as the source of the disturbance is not attacked.

Unfortunately, secular learning imitated the mistake of theological learning. In order to avoid the feeling of guilt and anxiety, it repressed the awareness of the religious need, just as theology repressed the aware-

ness of the discoveries of secular learning. This repression could be maintained only at a high price. For an effective repression increasingly affects not only its object but everything connected with it. In order to keep the religious problem out of awareness, one has to close consciousness to all issues that may lead to the religious question. This was now done by secular learning which created its own ivory tower. All risky issues were dropped one after the other—ontology, metaphysics, psychology of values, psychology of the self, psychology of will and emotions, theoretical speculation, creative thinking. Everything that could evoke the repressed anxiety of the split secular mind became tabu. A cheap materialism, a technical outlook, and a superficial scientism were among the defenses against the mounting inner anxiety of those who lived at the other side of the split. But these barriers against one or the other repressed side of Western man cannot hold. The psychological breakdowns are increasing among both groups of one-sided schizoid people. When the tension becomes too great to bear, there will not be a burning of witches but there may be an atomic holocaust that may finish the paranoid Western world.

The phenomenological psychology of the history of Western consciousness teaches Western humanity that it may still survive

its neurosis. Perhaps its last chance is to involve itself in a dialogue aimed at a restoration of the unity of consciousness in Western man. This dialogue would be on all levels. The secular and religious thinkers should leave their ivory towers and face the dividing issues in open field. The scope of this paper permits us only to consider the necessary dialectical attitude in one type of man, the Catholic intellectual.

The Phenomenological Psychology of the Ideal Christian Consciousness in the Catholic Intellectual.

The fundamental polarity in the Christian intellectual may arouse tension and anxiety. Anxiety in turn may lead to retreat and compromise, to security operations, defensiveness, escape from relevant issues, and unconscious betrayal of one's mission. It may seduce the intellectual to sell his birthright for a "safe" life and to settle for a fake intellectual existence, the pompous counterfeit of the real thing. Or he may be satisfied with a lower rung on the intellectual ladder than his talents warrant. In such a case, the man called to creative intellectual leadership forsakes his personal vocation and becomes a second rate technician who repeats faithfully what has been done in the past, or he becomes a mere collector of data, a compiler of what has been said over and over again

by others. He resembles some "great" theologians of half a century ago, famed for their output of "scholarly" textbooks. A careful comparison of the "creations" of these theological "leaders" with the textbooks of earlier writers usually led to the discovery that their authors were not dynamic thinkers but remarkable copyists, impressive imitators, and thoughtful plagiarists.

It is useful, to be sure, and even necessary that certain individuals compile the works that creative theologians have produced over the centuries. Their patient contribution to human education should be appreciated. But to hail them as "great" theologians or to revere them as "the" authorities in the realm of living Christian thought is deceptive and potentially damaging to the Christian cause. First of all, the celebration of the faithful compiler as a stupendous theological thinker may seduce the few who are called by talent and disposition to true creation to forsake this perilous enterprise. After all, it is less hazardous and more inviting to take charge of old boats in the harbor than to venture out into the open sea and to weather the tempest. Secondly, the diligent copyist may unfortunately assume for the Christian community the glamor of intellectual leadership and inspiring originality. But it is a sad truth that one cannot orient and stimulate dynamic dialectical thought among

one's fellow Christians merely by collecting frozen pieces of century-old insights. If the grand master of repetition, the taxidermist of theology, the undertaker of deceased heresies becomes the exclusive source of Christian thought, soon there is no Christian thought. There remains only a Christianity out of touch with this world, refusing dialogue and incarnation.

In such a case Christian universities deteriorate into dignified mausoleums of obsolete expressions of truth. They are no longer citadels of living thought, but dreary training schools producing neat rows of skilled technicians, solid professionals, and impeccable statisticians. But a people without vision will not flourish, a community of mere technicians cannot be humane, a culture of mere functionaries will disintegrate into a dead civilization. There is little left then of the grandeur of thought, the clash of ideas, the splendid battle of minds, the fiery fight for truth, the passionate dialogue with pagan thought which characterized the great universities of the past. For the passionate uncovering of truth from new perspectives fascinates the diligent dullard cramming for a degree no more than would a sack of cement, it sounds somehow odd and out of tune to the scientific technician, and it is dangerously suspect to the textbook copyist.

The lack of creativity, the silent death of

discovery, the scarcity of dialog, and the absence of dynamism in the Christian intellectual should be understood within the wider context of a mentality which over the centuries became increasingly static, defensive, one-sidedly essentialistic, and unduly preoccupied with security operations.

The Christian intellectual of the new generation recognizes that there is a *certain* distinction between the fundamental nature of the Church as founded and structured by his Lord and the changing appearances of this Church in the different phases and periods of culture. There is *some* distinction between what the Church basically is and the manner in which she is compelled to present herself to mortal men in limited situations. There is some difference between her fundamental Credo and her cultural dress, her eternal message and her temporary style, her divine inspiration and her psychological adaptation to the changing human condition.

The observable appearance of the Church is space and time changes in turn with the changing psychology of man in the various cultures and periods of culture. The temporary psychological self-presentation of the Church, her self-expression within a concrete situation may lead to a one-sided emphasis in the life of the faithful. Certain revealed truths or aspects of the truth may

recede into the background while others may emerge in the full light of intense interest and attention of a population with a specific psychological disposition. This polarity of recession and emergence manifests the Church's immanence and transcendence. She is always in the world within a limited cultural period, but she is never of this world. She always transcends a specific world in which she has embodied herself, ready to embrace the next world image of man, to grow with it, to purify it, and to transcend it in turn when a new culture appears.

This flexible play of emergence and recession in the vision of truth is strongly influenced by the psychology of the population within which the Church appears as the Mother of Salvation. The psychology of mankind changes with its changing situation; man is in continual transformation. The psychological presence of the Church should be in tune with this ongoing metamorphosis of man if she is truly to be a Church of incarnation. It is precisely within this field of phenomenal transfiguration of his Church that the Christian intellectual should participate in the Incarnation of his Lord in time and space. The psychologically effective appearance of the Church presupposes her understanding of the changing world of man. The intellectuals are, as it were, the radar of Christianity, the antennae of the

community of the faithful. They should keep the Church in tune with the transfigurations in the psychology of man. If the Christian intellectual is a natural scientist, he is in contact with the changes in human environment effected by science; if he is a social scientist, he is an expert in man's psychological response to the alternation of the world in which he lives; if he is a sculptor, painter, poet, novelist, or literary critic, he is sensitive to the word or image that touches the psychology of living men. This Christian intellectual should communicate his sensitivity for the life of his time to the theologian.

This dialog may lead to growth in the psychology of communication of the word of Salvation. It may precipitate a new emphasis on aspects of the truth which have remained veiled in other periods of culture but which become at once relevant to the new psychology of man. In addition, it may lead to new dialog with other Christian churches or even with non-Christian religions. For these latter may have already lived in an authentic way certain religious truths which have not been deeply lived by the average Catholic but which prove to be most relevant for the contemporary psyche. Examples are legion. Is it not true, for instance, that the average Catholic of certain cultures is far more disturbed — even some-

times to the point of obsession—by sins against the sixth and ninth commandments than by sins of uncharitable judgment and of social injustice? Is he not inclined to think, for example, that a conceited, uncharitable, socially unjust, but impeccably chaste mayor of a city is somehow better than, let us say, a deeply charitable and just artist who, because of his emotional temperament, is weak in temptations of the flesh but repents his repeated falls?

The face of the Church for the world is shaped by the truths that are stressed in sermons and the values that are lived by the faithful. The tuning in of theology, sermons, and lived values to the wave lengths of contemporary receptivity implies no essential change in the treasure of the Revelation. It suggests a new accentuation in the light of the psychology of our times. Only a Church which is resonant to cultural change remains psychologically vigorous and renews its perennial youth so that it appeals to heart and mind of man.

On the other hand, the Christian intellectual should recognize that his concern with the psychology of his contemporaries should not deteriorate into psychologism. Theology should take psychology into account, but psychology should never dictate to theology. Psychology may point to revealed truths; it does not create or structure them. Again,

psychology may suggest the relevance of certain religious values and their position within the structure of human receptivity at certain age levels or in certain cultural situations. But psychology can never make a pronouncement concerning the absolute position of these truths and values within the very inner structure of the Revelation. Pastoral psychology becomes pastoral psychologism when it blurs out, obscures, or disguises real differences between Catholic faith and certain psychological inclinations of contemporary man. When this happens, concern for psychological adaptation replaces the primary concern for the truth. However, we should emphasize here that we are speaking only about *real* differences which are rooted in Catholic *faith* itself and not merely in one or another position of theologians *about* this Faith. For it is not impossible that a theologian or group of theologians may accentuate aspects of Faith which are not accentuated in the same way or with the same vigor in Faith itself. An opposition between theology and the mentality of modern man is not necessarily an opposition between Faith and human psychology.

The dialogue between Faith and the intellectual of our time leads to a new presentation of the Revelation. The attempt, however, to express truth in a contemporary language which is psychologically relevant should not

be misunderstood in a rationalistic way. According to the rationalist view, one should first eliminate all possible human representations and cultural denotations of the truth. Then one should stand back and perceive, as it were, the "naked" truth purely in itself, unadulterated by any possible image, sense perception, cultural connotation, or psychological relevance. After careful consideration of the bare truth stripped of all possible human and cultural viewpoints, one slips it casually into a new psychological dress which can be facilely changed when the naked truth is to be exported to another culture. It may even be more efficient to have a division of labor by which some intellectuals specialize in the consideration of the bare truth, while others busy themselves with the production of manifold cultural dresses which can be modeled according to the requirements of cultural period or geographical area.

This rationalist conception is a fallacy. An authentic expression of truth is always the insight itself into truth. There is never a moment, even a fraction of a second, in which a human being is able to perceive the "naked" truth in itself. A new expression of truth is not something added to or superimposed on truth like make-up of one's face or artificial color to one's hair. The new expression when it is authentic is organically

rooted in the insight itself into truth. Authentic human expression of truth presupposes by its very nature that we do not conceive of truth in a static fashion as if we were able to lay aside our concrete human situation or perspective in order to look upon truth in itself. It is not so that one specific expression of truth in one cultural situation, or in one linguistic medium, or within one theoretical system, is "the" representation of truth itself, while all other possible expressions are cultural-psychological and consequently less dependable, less valid, and less true. According to this view, the Christian intellectual who lives in dialog is a Santa Claus who adorns the Christmas tree of barren truth with glittering decorations, a missionary who hands gaudy beads to bewildered natives, or a Pied Piper who gathers fellow intellectuals for the Sunday sermon.

The psychological relevance of the contemporary expression of Faith, however, should not be an artificial addition to the truth. Indeed, the psychological relevance of the truth always appears naturally, irresistibly in the expression of truth itself. This expression is not an appendix to an essential-abstract truth which would be unpsychological and culturally irrelevant in itself. An authentic expression of truth is intrinsic to the vision of truth itself; it implies by its

very nature psychological and cultural aspects which relate to the period in which those men lived who formulated it. Since truth is always expressed by and for human beings of a specific period of a specific culture, it always implies the specific psychology which is the outcome of that culture.

For example, the scholastic expression of truth in the Middle Ages was psychologically relevant for the intellectuals of that period of our civilization. But this typical psychological adaptation to the Christian intellectual of the Middle Ages was inherent in the truth-view itself; it brought to the fore aspects, and structures of the Revelation which would not have been discovered in another age. Therefore, these discoveries should not be neglected in later periods of history. They should be respectfully integrated with the new emphases on other aspects of the Revelation under perspectives opened up by other psychological approaches of man. The relevance of revealed truth for contemporary life is a real and fundamental aspect of truth itself, inherent in itself, opening up truth itself; truth understood not in a static essentialistic but in a dynamic unfolding sense.

A stationary unpsychological notion of truth would isolate the Christian intellectual from the contemporary scene because he would then express truth in a language

which his fellow intellectuals would not be able to understand. It would make sense only to those who, like him, had insulated themselves from what is really happening in the world today. It is an illusion to believe in the myth of supra-temporal language, out of this world, untouched by transitory human culture, made up of expressions which never become obsolete. The truth can be discovered only in the current of history, by means of changing cultures and languages, each of them revealing different aspects of truth. The superstition of a culture-free, unpsychological, and therefore inhuman language always leads in practice to the implicit affirmation that the expression of one historically conditioned period of culture is "the" absolute expression. For culture-free language does not exist; one can only substitute the limited expression of another cultural period for one's own.

In the later case, the synthesis which resulted from the past dialogue of the past Christian intellectual within a certain limited culture would replace the present dialogue of the Christian intellectual of today with his own culture. It would then be proclaimed as the dialogue of dialogues, the final confrontation with the world which led to the ultimate expression of the truth, the fixed model to which all expression of truth

in subsequent periods should conform. Such absolutism of one limited cultural expression is in fact relativism of the truth. For it asserts that one form of synthesis of divine and human revelation is the ultimate synthesis; that every other attempt at synthesis is superfluous and irrelevant.

But the expression of truth by Christian intellectuals is a task which is never finished; it is a labor of love to be taken up daily as long as they exist; it is their very existence, their '*raison d'être*.' Truth emerges into the light in the turbulent historicity of human existence and nowhere else.

It is true that Christian language differs from non-Christian expression; it should be inspired and enlightened by the Revelation. But it is nevertheless the always changing language of man. It is characteristic of the creative Christian intellectual to believe in Revelation as absolute, and at the same time to engage with his Church in dialogue with the Revelation in order to discover structures and dimensions previously less emphasized in Christian life. The truth is absolute, but the manifold modes in which truth is perceived and believed are relative; they reveal but never exhaust the truth, they never steal its secret, empty its treasure, or solve its mystery. Each limited quest of truth, however, is animated and directed by the intention and desire to unveil the abso-

lute truth, to uncover its aspects, to mine its treasure. This persisting identical orientation unites all separate Christian attempts to shed new light on Revelation through dialogue. The identical intention inherent in each single dialectical approach guarantees the absolute truth of true knowledge and insures the continuity between all limited views and perspectives. This intentionality is, as it were, the conductor of the great orchestra of Catholic intellectuals of all fields and all times, each playing his own instrument but keeping in tune with the united effort of the whole.

Animated by this orientation, Catholic intellectuals in different domains of study continually compel Christianity to illuminate Revelation from a variety of viewpoints which constantly emerge in their fields of investigation. In this indirect way the Catholic intellectual promotes an increasingly pure perspective on the truth. His humble questioning fosters a progressive attitude which is a necessary condition for the continuous unfolding of the truth in all its splendor, infinite relevance, and psychological appeal. A fixation on any one of the many possible illuminations of the truth is by its very nature a violation of truth itself.

A Catholic intellectual within his own field is constantly faced with new viewpoints and sensitivities. The new visions in

his area of art or science may be blended with untruth, prejudice, premature generalizations, and naive over-valuations of recent discoveries. Nevertheless, they throw a new light on truth; they grant a new insight into the truth which previously was not perceived under these unforeseen angles, at least not explicitly.

It may prove impossible to integrate these newly discovered aspects with the *standardized expressions* of truth as perceived in a past cultural period. Artificially pouring the new wine into old bottles may even prove dangerous. It may sometimes be that only the living contemporary expression can encompass the aspects of truth stressed by a new generation which speaks a new idiom. Here another dialogue begins: the interdisciplinary encounter of Catholic intellectuals who specialize in philosophy and theology, the natural and human sciences, and the art of contemporary expression and communication.

The contemporary expression of newly unveiled aspects of the truth does not leave untouched the traditional expression of formerly discovered aspects. The growth in insight fostered by the Catholic intellectual who lives in genuine dialogue is not an accidental, extrinsic addition to the past perception of Christianity. Each new vision, in fact, leads to a gradual reconstruction of

traditional perception and expression. Far from destroying former insight and vision, it deepens and completes them so that they re-emerge in fuller splendor. No authentic insight into the truth can be sealed off from any earlier or later perspective. Truth cannot be compartmentalized or isolated; it grows organically to an increasing fullness of its revelation. The partial manifestation of truth in the past remains truth, but it loses its irresistible appeal as truth for people today if it is communicated in a manner which seems to exclude its later complementary appearance. Indeed, a later complementary truth may reveal more fully the meaning of its former partial revelation. In such a case it would be untrue and inauthentic to repeat and affirm certain aspects of the truth discovered in former periods of culture, while concealing or suppressing the later complementary truth.

The psychology of the Catholic intellectual is characterized by a genuine concern for those complementary aspects of the truth to which he is sensitized by his openness within his field of competence. His humble dialogue with Christianity within his own area of scholarship helps to save Christianity from the static thinking which always leads to making one partial expression of truth absolute. The Catholic intellectual is thus co-responsible for the purity of faith and the

increasing openness of Christianity for the hidden treasure of the Revelation. The maintenance of this purity requires not solely, and not even first and foremost, the repetition of what has been formulated in past centuries of Christian thought. The purity of faith requires first of all the increasingly differentiated integration of newly uncovered aspects of revealed truth within the balanced totality of Faith. If this does not take place continuously, it becomes difficult to maintain Faith pure in daily life because the psychological life of many of the faithful becomes so obsessed by partial truth that the total truth suffers. The one-sidedness may lead in many to a breakdown in mental health. When Christians in their psychological life identify a partial truth with the total Christian vision, they may even be a menace to mental health and hygiene in the human community.

Christianity then loses its meaning, appeal, and fascination for those contemporaries who have already seen beyond the limited vision of the past or who sense the unwholesome psychological impact of this one-sidedness on the life, dynamism, and openness of the faithful. It appears to these outsiders that the limited partial views of a past Christianity simply exclude the new partial visions of man. They cannot understand how new visions of truth relate to this Faith and

how they can be harmoniously integrated with former perspectives.

It is the task of the Catholic intellectual to manifest persistently the new discoveries in his field, and so to foster constant dialogue which is the mother of the unfolding of truth and the guardian of its purity.

We may conclude that a Catholic intellectual has a twofold vocation. As an intellectual he shares the mission of mankind to unveil truth, to listen to reality, no matter where his voice is heard. He is the messenger of the revelation of Reality in his own century and culture, the herald of the self-disclosure of Being. He illuminates reality for humanity by his witness of what is revealed to his vision. As a beacon of light he points the way for his generation in mastery of the earth, conquest of the universe, creation of culture, and growth in human dignity.

As a Christian he participates at the same time in the gift of divine Revelation which manifests itself century after century to the adoring gaze of redeemed humanity. The treasure of Revelation may suddenly light up in unprecedented splendor in the minds of men when seen in the perspective of fresh discoveries in art and science. This does not mean that the vision of man can add to the treasure-trove of Revealed Truth itself. Such pretense would be blasphemy, the hubris of

a proud mortal who deems himself a god. But a new appearance of reality may remove the veil from human vision and expose men to an aspect of Revelation that was there in all its resplendence from the very beginnings. It was hidden from their eyes not because of its absence, but because of their lack of presence. A new message of this earth may sensitize the ears of men for unsuspected nuances of the message of the Lord. And a new work of the poet may prepare the way for the Word that fills the universe.

The creative Christian intellectual participates equally in the growth of culture and in the Christian effort to illuminate each new emergence of culture by the light of Revelation. For the Christian intellectual believes in the divine embrace of human culture, he is the humble occasion of the incarnation of Christ in man's evolution, the troubadour of the love story between the Divine and the human that began with creation and will end in the celebration of transterrestrial humanity renewed in Christ.

The Christian intellectual, therefore, is a man of dialogue in whom two worlds meet; he is a participant in the dialogue between theology and science, supernatural and natural revelation, divine and human contemplation, heaven and earth, and God and man. Every authentic Christian shares in some

way in this movement of incarnation in his daily life. The Christian intellectual, however, is as it were an ordained professional of this fateful encounter within his own area of knowledge. When he is a creative participant in his own field of learning, he may be able to illuminate the understanding of his fellow Christians as well as that of his fellow intellectuals. His cultural competence may enlighten the Christian community, suggest a new advent of Revelation. He may open up for incarnation a new area of the human universe of meaning gained from the night of not-knowing. On the other hand, his Christian perspective will brighten the intellectual's exploration of the unknown; it will open up angles of vision mankind would not have dreamt of without Divine Revelation.

Within the mind of the Christian intellectual, divine and human perspectives should thus be in constant interaction, enriching each other, stimulating each other's growth, penetrating each other's realm of meaning.

SUMMARY

We have considered the psychology of the creative Catholic intellectual. First we discussed the historical development of the structure of his psychology. This phenomenological psychology of history taught us that the consciousness of the Catholic intellectual is split between a religious and a secular commitment. We recognized that this split was the manifestation in the intellectual realm of a far deeper existential split which pervaded all of Christianity. A psychological analysis of history made clear how this division of mind developed and how it affected in a special way the intellectual laymen. Finally we concluded that Western man today is affected by this dualism regardless of his religion or outlook. The only solution seemed to us a dialogue on all levels of knowledge.

In the second part of this paper we discussed the dialectical viewpoint that the theologian and the intellectual should take if they really want to contribute to the reintegration of Western consciousness before total destruction takes over.

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*We are indebted to such Dutch authors as Gielen, Schillebeeck and van der Berg. The works concerned did not appear in any of the major languages. Therefore, we have substituted for them some of the English publications which represent in the United States the new thought in theology, philosophy and psychology.

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